Reso 2015-2445 - Laserfiche WebLink

Home Browse Search

displayed to the jury. See City Nat'l Bank, 715 So. 2d at 352-53; see also Target Corp., 937 So. 2d at 706 (holding trial court erred in denying petitioner's motion in limine to exclude respondent's site plan when respondent had neither included the disputed site plan in its original submittal to the city nor taken any affirmative steps toward fulfilling the plan). This was yet another fundamental error that contaminated the trial. G. The speculative testimony erroneously admitted was especially prejudicial because it came from expert witnesses. It is well-established that expert witnesses are not permitted to give opinion testimony that is based upon pure speculation. See, e.g., Cerna v. S. Fla. Bioavailability Clinic, Inc., 815 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) ("A court 'must assure itself that the [expert] opinions are based on relevant scientific methods, processes, and data, and not upon an expert's mere speculation.— (quoting Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So. 2d 552, 569 n.14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)); see also M.A. Hajianpour, M.D., P.A. v. Khosrow Maleki, P.A., 932 So. 2d 459, 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("When the expert's opinion is based on speculation and conjecture, not supported by the facts, or not arrived at by recognized methodology, the testimony will be stricken."). Yet, in the instant case, that is exactly what occurred. In the eyes of a jury, opinion testimony from an expert is, in all likelihood, given great weight. To that end, it is imperative that the court fulfill its role as a gatekeeper and ensure that no speculative opinion testimony is admitted. Here, the fact that the above-described speculative testimony came from Respondent's experts therefore compounded the prejudicial effect of its admission. 14